Some better summaries of the Neyaptin (2003) passage:

 Original passage: (see footnote below)

 Whatever the circumstances for establishing an independent central bank may be, the maintenance of its independence requires supporting societal preferences.  An independent central bank facilitates the emergence of anti-inflation lobbies by way of imposing hard budget constraints, which force financial intermediaries to internalize the costs of risky lending and thus allocate credits efficiently.  Efficient allocation of resources, in turn, drive inefficient enterprises out of the market, helping reduce both budget deficits and thereby the pressures for monetary expansion. (p. 459)

 Summarized:

 Maintaining central bank independence requires political support from the country’s economic actors.  According to Neyaptin (2003, p. 459), a central bank can encourage such support by imposing hard budget constraints and weeding out the inefficient enterprises.  This policy makes resource allocation more efficient and reduces the budget deficit and therefore diminishes the political need for inflationary monetary policy.

 Neyaptin (2003, p. 459) argues that social support for anti-inflationary policy can be fomented by an independent central bank that imposes hard budget constraints on the country’s financial institutions.  Banks will lend efficiently if they are forced to bear the costs of questionable loans.  As a result, inefficient enterprises fail and the budget deficit improves, reducing the political pressure for looser monetary policy. 

 Economists claim that eliminating government subsidies to financial institutions will generate support for an independent central bank through a mechanism that is both political and economic.  From an economic point of view, financial institutions will improve the quality of their loans, eliminating enterprises that are draining the government budget.  Politically, since the budget deficit improves, there is less pressure to expand the money supply, allowing the central bank to remain independent (Neyaptin, 2003, p. 459).

footnote: Taken from Neyapti, B. (2003). Budget deficits and inflation: The roles of central bank independence and financial market development. Contemporary Economic Policy, 41, 458-481